 | Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War Subjects: Hiroshima-shi (Japan) -- History -- Bombardment 1945; Nagasaki-shi (Japan) -- History -- Bombardment 1945; Automic bomb -- United States -- History; World War 1939–1945 -- Japan; Capitulations Military -- Japan -- History -- 20th century; Drawing on evidence that the atomic bomb was regarded as a weapon like any other before its first use, Princeton University's Gordin offers a concise and provocative reinterpretation of the beginning of the nuclear age. For the American military commanders in charge of the bomb, the main consideration was whether it would destroy enemy personnel and infrastructure as part of a "shock strategy" for winning Japan's unconditional surrender. Launching the nuclear missions from Tinian Island, the B-29 airplane base, further normalized the bomb's use within the matrix of Pacific island combat. Consideration of such special characteristics as radiation was muted until after the Japanese capitulation-indeed, discussions of a "Third Shot," with Tokyo the probable target, continued until the successful American occupation began in September 1945. The initially overwhelming support of the American public for the nuclear strikes reflected a belief that the war might have lasted more than another year. Even in that context, half the population opposed using gas in an attack-another indication, according to Gordin, that the atom bomb's special status was a postwar development. His worthy study concludes that the bomb's uniqueness has inappropriately encouraged Japan's reluctance to recognize and evaluate its war responsibility, and points toward the importance of examining nuclear weapons outside the familiar context of a nuclear standoff. (Feb.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved Michael D. Gordin is professor of the history of science at Princeton University. He is the author or editor of several books, including Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly . |
