Ebooks for the Classroom+Faculty

Morality and Epistemic Judgement
ISBN: 9780198842736
Platform/Publisher: Oxford Academic / Oxford University Press
Digital rights: Users: Unlimited; Printing: Unlimited; Download: Unlimited
Subjects: Philosophy Metaphysics/ Epistemology Moral Philosophy;

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false.The most interesting argument against the moral error theory is the argument from analogy. According to this view, the theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments--judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence--and could undermine systematic thought and reasonthemselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment the argument from analogy, reasoning that it fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light ofour evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.